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Abstract Title: Epistemological Uncertainty and Political Ideology: Exploring the
Relationship Between Temporal Threats and Ideology
Chairperson: Lucian Gideon Conway, III, Ph.D.
Research in motivation suggests that individuals are highly attuned to perceived risk and
danger and tend to form groups (physical and ideological) on the basis of the threats they
collectively share with like-minded others. These initial stages of threat detection and
evaluation are often found to occur through subtle environmental cues. This study
examined the relationship between feelings of uneasiness and political ideology through
the framing of temporal cues (e.g., past- vs. future-tense). Participants (n = 181) were
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were randomly assigned a
short vignette about a relatable life experience (e.g., purchasing a car). Each vignette was
written in either the past-tense or the future-tense, and after reading the vignette,
participants reported their emotional response to the presented scenario (e.g., “If I were in
the scenario, I would feel uneasy.”) using a Likert-type scale. Participants’ levels of
ideological conservatism were then measured. Counter to expectations, a negative
interaction was found between ideological conservatism and temporal condition on
uneasiness: Conservatives experienced more uneasiness when exposed to past-tense
scenarios while liberals experienced more uneasiness when exposed to future-tense
scenarios. However, partially consistent with expectations, conservatives’ uneasiness was
partially mediated by forecasted (but not observed) risk. Implications, limitations, and
possible future directions for the research are discussed.
Keywords: Non-conscious perception, political ideology formation, temporal orientation !
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"Better the devil you know than the devil you don't know.”!
-Irish proverb, circa 1300sAD.

When examining the motivations of human behavior, the cynic is left to wonder if
credit should be given to the angels of our good nature or if it is due instead to the devils
that we fear. As much as we would like to believe our better natures drive the majority of
our actions and ideologies, perhaps there in an underlying truth to the idea that human
behavior is often best explained by a desire to choose the lesser devil. Maybe there are
situations where we are drawn to follow one path simply because the alternative is too
unpleasant to consider.
Indeed, the power of fear on behavior is a fairly well-established phenomenon in
human psychology, and although its function and existence are most often associated
with a long distant evolutionary past, we still have plenty of evidence that it persists in
our modern everyday lives (for an overview, see Tannenbaum et al., 2015). While fears
can often be directly attributed to individual experience (e.g., PTSD due to personal
trauma), humans appear to have a selective innate wariness of potential dangers that both
precedes and lends itself to the influence of outside forces (Åhs et al., 2018; Del Giudice,
2020). This innate wariness to specific stimuli in our environments is not limited to
physical threats, but also seems to appear in proximity to metaphysical threats as well
(e.g., challenges to one’s identity, morals, or ideology; Brandt et al. 2021; Crawford,
2017; Haidt, & Joseph, 2004). These fear-based responses seem to be automatically or
non-consciously generated by a type of “intuitive cognition” that creates feelings of
uneasiness upon encountering specific risks and dangers (Haidt, & Joseph, 2004).
Research in political psychology shows that this intuitive cognition may influence higherorder cognitive activities, such as reasoning through a moral dilemma, or choosing and

1

defending one’s political ideology (Haidt, & Joseph, 2004). Other studies show that even
though we tend to assume our inclinations, decisions, and opinions are the result of
rational thought and conscious deliberation, they are more a reflection of our gut level
instincts that we then justify and rationalize afterwards (Haidt, 2001; Hauser et al., 2007).
Examples like those above would suggest that one’s reasoned/conscious
responses often depend on the non-conscious sensitivity to the encountered situation. Or
in other words, the degree of conscious engagement is positively correlated with the
innate salience of the associated threat. Thus, when encountering situations that hold
greater salience to one’s intuitive cognitions, one’s reasoned responses are likely to be
activated to a similar degree. These differences in salience are made especially prominent
when examining the moral foundations of different ideologies (Graham et al., 2011;
Graham et al., 2012a; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Research suggests that the explicit
endorsement of specific “moral foundations” (areas of moral concern, e.g., Care,
Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) is preceded by a state of neural excitation
implicitly triggered by morally salient words and statements (Graham et al., 2012b). This
neural excitation appears to vary asymmetrically between liberals and conservatives
depending on whether the target words or statements presented either related positively or
negatively to a preferred set of moral foundations (e.g., primarily Care and Fairness for
liberals, and primarily Care, Fairness Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity for conservatives;
Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).
These areas of intuitive moral concerns are not shared equally between members
of different political ideologies, resulting in degrees of disparity when prioritizing
different ideological policies and outcomes. One example of this is in the level of support
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for public policies aimed at reducing the risks and danger of climate change. Research
suggests that individuals who selectively value the moral foundations of Care and
Fairness are more likely to endorse public policies that may reduce or circumvent the
dangerous effects of climate change, whereas the individuals who value all five
foundations (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) were less likely to endorse
those same policies (Dawson & Tyson, 2012). This difference in support falls roughly
along the ideological lines of the political right and left where conservatives tend to be
less supportive of government sponsored policies designed to address climate change and
liberals tend to support them.
Importantly, past work also suggests that politically right and left persons tend to
express differing preferences in their temporal orientation as indicated by the relative
frequency of temporally focused words used by each group (e.g., conservatives tend to
use more past-orientated language while liberals tend to use more future-oriented
language; Robinson et al., 2015).
Building on this past work, this present study explored the relationship between
subtle temporal cues and fear-based responses in the political right and left populations.
Using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), 181 participants were asked to report their
levels of uneasiness after reading a scenario written with either a future- or past-tense
framing. Following this, a two-item political ideology scale was used to determine the
direction and strength of their self-identified political orientation (liberal/democrat and
conservative/republican).
It was expected that feelings of uneasiness due to subtle temporal cues would be
related to political ideology, with liberals more likely to report higher levels of uneasiness
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in the past-tense condition and conservatives more likely to report higher levels of
uneasiness in the future-tense condition. Results were mixed with some patterns
identified. Regression analyses found a significant negative interaction between
uneasiness and political ideology in the past- and future-tense conditions, with liberals
expressing higher levels of uneasiness in the future-tense condition and conservatives
reporting more uneasiness in the past-tense condition. While this negative interaction is
in the opposite direction than predicted, additional analyses found that a sensitivity to
forecasted risk (but not observed risk) partially accounted for the relationship between
political conservatism and uneasiness in both the future- and past-tense conditions.
Below, I will discuss some of the research surrounding the biological mechanisms
involved with the early detection of threats in humans. This will include an overview of
how specific dangers appear to have greater salience in triggering intuitive threat
evaluations and responses, as well as research that illustrates how these intuitive
responses might influence our higher order cognitions such as attitudes and volitional
behaviors. Next, I will examine how political ideologies can be influenced and
maintained by the presence of salient non-conscious threats, including ways that these
types of threats are asymmetrically processed by the political right- and left-wing
populations. Finally, I will lay out a theoretical model that looks at the differences found
between the political right and left in their innate preferences towards temporal
orientations and how those preferences are shaped by the negative salience of temporally
orientated language.
Early Threat Detection and Vigilance (Behavioral and Cognitive Priming)
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Before we can understand something as complex as how one’s political ideologies
might be influenced by subtle (yet perhaps threatening) temporally oriented cues, we
must first examine the biological origin and purpose of fear itself. Fear activation is
largely recognized as a “hardwired” cognitive process that heavily involves a small
subcortical area of the brain known as the amygdala. Research suggests that activation of
this “fear center” has a downstream effect on an organism’s physiological (e.g., heart
rate, galvanic skin response, etc.) and behavioral responses (e.g., fight, flight, freeze, etc.)
to both consciously and non-consciously perceived risks and dangers (Ohman et al.,
2007). While the interconnected nature of the brain is such that one process cannot
function in isolation, it does appear that one of the amygdala’s main roles (aided in part
by other neurological systems) is to detect threats and to initiate action by that organism
(human or otherwise) to avoid, circumvent, navigate, or escape those threats. In some
situations, it would appear that this fear detection system is primed to see specific
dangers as more threatening than others. For example, “biological preparedness” is the
phenomenon where some objects, animals, and/or situations trigger faster, and more
extinction resistant, fear-based responses than other types of “neutral” stimuli. In past
experiments, target stimuli are paired with an unpleasant experience (e.g., presenting a
picture of either a spider or a butterfly accompanied by a loud noise). Exposure to certain
target stimuli (e.g., spiders or snakes) tend to immediately elicit a heightened fear-based
reaction that remains in strong effect for an extended period of time. In contrast, more
neutral stimuli (e.g., butterflies or flowers) either fail to elicit a fear-based response, or
the fear-based response is quickly extinguished soon thereafter (for recent overviews and
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analysis of biological preparedness theory, please see Åhs et al., 2018; Del Giudice,
2020).
Applied to our present topic, this suggests that a primary question in identifying
whether a similar process might produce generalized group behavior is: When and how
are potential threats identified? Historically, it has been theorized that the criteria given
for threat detection and vigilance towards danger was thought to originate from “higher
level” cortical processes (i.e., consciousness). However, research now strongly suggests
that subcortical activity (i.e., non-conscious perception) plays a significant role in early
threat detection and response activation (Ohman et al., 2007). Early activation of these
fear detection systems might seem disconnected from deliberative behaviors, but there
are examples of how automatic threat monitoring generalizes itself to the actions we
consciously undertake in our daily lives. The subtle awareness of one’s environmental
cues seems to have real world impact on both our volition and observable behavior, as
demonstrated in a study by Winkielman et al. (2005) that examined participants’ behavior
following non-conscious exposure to either angry or happy faces. In this study,
researchers found that when participants experienced non-conscious exposure to angry
faces, their consumption behaviors decreased, along with their willingness to procure
additional resources for consumption. However, the participants who were nonconsciously exposed to smiling faces increased their consumption behaviors and later
demonstrated a greater willingness to procure additional resources for consumption
(Winkielman et al., 2005). This suggests that these subtle perceptions not only affect us at
a basic physiological level, but contribute to our behavioral patterns as well.
In support of this idea, a study by Carretie ́ et al. (2005) found that subcortical
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activity within the amygdala (via non-conscious threat perception) may directly initiate
higher order cognitive processes in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. This area of the
brain is commonly thought to be responsible for conscious decision-making, judgment
and long-term planning. Other studies show that participants who are unconsciously
primed with “polite” words tend to engage in more respectful behavior than those primed
with “rude” words (Bargh et al., 1996), again suggesting that higher-order processes,
such as volitional social behaviors, are partially rooted in the subtle perception of salient
danger.
Studies like these suggest that subcortical, non-conscious, activation of fearcenters are not restricted to only producing basic physiological responses like heart rate,
fight or flight, etc., but may directly contribute to both our observable behaviors as well
as our perceived volition in choosing those behaviors. The results from these types of
studies could be an indication that our social behaviors and attitudes may sometimes
originate with the subcortical awareness of salient, non-conscious, threats.
Non-Conscious Threats and Ideology Formation
If our cognitions and behavior can be invisibly impacted by non-conscious threats
and dangers, might this play a role in the creation of political populations? Are there
common themes in how non-conscious threat guides ideology formation? Could there be
systematic deviations to those themes?
Some researchers make the case that tribalism is a common thread at the heart of
all groups and political ideologies (Clark & Winegard, 2019). This research argues that
humans have an innate need to favor their “ingroup” (a social group you identify with, as
opposed to an “outgroup” you do not identify with), even if such favoritism is achieved at
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the expense of empirical truth or reality. This innate need is argued to be the result of a
shared evolutionary history where the better organized groups (or political parties) were
able to consistently prevail over those who did not successfully band together.
Historically, losing these battles meant the loss of life-sustaining resources or even
outright death for the members of the less organized group. In these cases, failing to
overcome one’s individual differences in favor of the group’s superordinate goals would
cause the entire population to pay a steep price.
In modern times the result is not typically as drastic, yet it can be argued that this
process, created and sustained by millennia of group warfare, is still evident in the
modern political climate (Clark & Winegard, 2019). This ingroup favoritism is seen
clearly in studies that suggest partisan bias can often be found in equal measure among
members of both political parties (Ditto et al., 2018a; Ditto et al., 2018b).1 Other studies
in this area also confirm that neither end of the political spectrum is free from intolerance
or openminded to all points of view (Brandt et al., 2014; Crawford & Brandt, 2020;
Peters et al., 2020; Schepisi et al, 2019). One such study examined participants’ ability
and disposition to make use of quantitative information (numeracy) to determine if such
skills allowed for a more valid and comprehensive interpretation of politically charged
information. Results suggested that while elevated levels of numeracy were helpful in
accurately evaluating neutral topics, they were in fact counterproductive in the face of
politically charged topics, resulting in an increase of political polarization due to elevated
levels of quantitative-reasoning in selectively interpreting the data (Kahan et al, 2017).
Given the studies that suggest all political parties share a common intolerance for

1

It is important to note that this is a contested issue with some claiming the similarities in partisan bias are
a false equivalence with one side having more justification in their bias (Baron & Jost, 2019).
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their outgroups or competing ideologies, it is a different question to ask where and how
that intolerance is triggered and subsequently directed. Results from recent neuroimaging
studies suggest that the non-conscious perception of various threats appears to vary
between political populations (Mendez, 2017). These studies show there are measurable
neurological differences (both in levels of activity and mass) between liberals and
conservatives in the areas of the brain involved with approach and avoidance behaviors.
According to these neuroimaging studies, conservatives (in comparison to liberals) show
greater activity in areas associated with the negativity bias (where exposure to negative
stimuli results in increased focus and higher arousal), disgust (violation of a sense of
purity), and threat sensitivity (aversion to potential risk). While liberals (in comparison to
conservatives) show greater activity in areas of the brain associated with approach
behavior and potential change (e.g., exploring new actions in response to conflict or risk;
Mendez, 2017). This provides some indication that structural neurological differences
may play a role in the formation and reinforcement of political ideologies. Additionally,
these neurological differences lend support to the idea that members of the political left
may have greater neural resources dedicated to the engagement of unknown risks and
dangers while members of the political right may have greater neural resources dedicated
to the engagement of known risks and dangers.
The Present Theory: The Interface of Ideology and Temporal-Based Threats
So far, it would appear that perceptions of danger play a pivotal role in shaping
our cognitions and behaviors, but do certain types of dangers lend themselves to being
classified as “known” and “unknown”? The “devils” that have traditionally plagued
humanity are often very easy to identify. A short list of these potential hazards might
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include a variety of dangers, from environmental risks such as famine, disease, wild
animals, and extreme weather or topography, to more societal threats like intergroup
conflict, exploitation, criminal activity, and oppressive social structures (e.g.,
totalitarianism). While many threats are easily quantified by observing their occurrence
in the past, forecasted threats (risks and dangers that are projected to occur rather than
having occurred) do not as readily lend themselves to the same perceptual status as
observed threats. Forecasted threats by their nature retain an element of uncertainty.
Perhaps, these forecasted threats could be thought of as the devils that wait unknown in
the shadows. With the appeal of the unknown, they present a medium of malleability, a
way to dynamically engage with the future rather than the static past. In contrast,
observed threats more easily adopt the role of the devil that we know. With the appeal of
the known, they present a foundation of stability, allowing one to firmly engage with the
established past rather than the uncertain future.
Temporal Orientation and Political Ideology
Accepting the premise that there are two types of “devils” in the world (observed
and forecasted) may partially answer how temporal perception is involved with the
formation and maintenance of different political ideologies. Is there any existing evidence
that would support an ideological divide along this dimension? Yes. For example, in a
study by Robinson et al., (2015), they found that liberals reference the future to a higher
degree and use more future-oriented language in comparison to conservatives. While
conversely, conservatives tended to reference the past and use more past-orientated
language in comparison to liberals. It is possible these preferences in temporal orientation
may be indicative of an innate need to substantiate and/or alleviate the asymmetrical fears
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of these opposing ideological positions.
Another recent example looking at the effect of temporal cues on ideological
positions is a study conducted by Lammers & Baldwin (2018). In this study they found
that communicating liberal topics to conservatives using a past-temporal focus (compared
with a future-temporal focus) reduced political disagreement between liberals and
conservatives by between 30-100% depending on topic. However, in this example the
researchers failed to find that communicating conservative topics to liberals using a
future temporal focus had the same effect.
Another area of research that may give us some insight into the asymmetry of
political ideology and temporal orientation is the domain of information gathering.
Studies have looked at the amount of effort participants were willing to apply in the
acquisition of novel information and found that liberals (in comparison to conservatives)
demonstrated a greater degree of willingness to engage with increasing amounts of novel
information (Tullett et al., 2016). The researchers point out that while their findings could
be construed as conservatives having an aversion to engage with novel information, it
was intriguing to note that conservative participants’ indicated levels of curiosity in the
novel information was the same as their liberal participants. While not tested for, this
could be an indication that conservative participants’ curiosity was easily satiated by the
provided (observed) information, while the liberal participants’ unsatiated willingness to
engage in increasing amounts of information may indicate a need to engage with
unprovided (forecasted) knowledge.
The Present Project: Non-Conscious Temporal Threat
Overall, there appears to be evidence for the idea that humans are hardwired to
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unconsciously monitor for, detect, and guard against specific potential threats. It also
appears that non-consciously perceived threats may at times automatically integrate
themselves into higher order cognitive processes (including ideology formation and
maintenance). Additionally, subpopulations of the political right and left tend to favor
opposing temporal orientations (e.g., past vs future).
While past research has identified connections between political ideology,
intuitive threat perception, and temporal orientations, it has not directly addressed the
possibility that subtle temporal cues play an early role in the asymmetrical formation and
maintenance of the political right- and left-wing’s attitudes and beliefs. In the present
study, I theorized that priming participants with subtle temporal cues in a potentially
anxiety-producing scenario would reveal systematic ideological differences due to
diverging temporal-based perceptions of risk and danger. This subtle priming was carried
out by asking participants to read short scenarios that depicted a relatable and possibly
anxiety-inducing experience written in either the future- or past-tense. Following this,
participants reported their levels of uneasiness with the scenario they just read, then
completed a measure of whether they found forecasted or observed threat to be more
concerning. Finally, participants filled out a demographic questionnaire which included a
two-item political ideology scale (measured on a continuum from liberal to conservative).
These measurements were then used to determine if there was a relationship between
ideological conservatism and uneasiness in the context of temporally oriented language
(future-tense vs. past-tense), and if that relationship could be explained by the political
subpopulations’ feelings of concern over either forecasted or observed threat.
Hypotheses
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H1: Ideological conservatism will have a conditional effect on uneasiness in pasttense vs. future-tense conditions:
H1a: Exposure to future-tense scenarios will result in a positive correlation
between ideological conservatism and uneasiness.
H1b: Exposure to past-tense scenarios will result in a negative correlation
between ideological conservatism and uneasiness.
H2: Sensitivity to risk and danger will partially explain the relationship between
temporal orientation, ideological conservatism and uneasiness:
H2a: Because conservatives are hypothesized to be more sensitive to forecasted
risk, sensitivity to forecasted risk and danger will partially account for the positive
correlation between ideological conservatism and uneasiness in the future-tense
condition.
H2b: Because liberals are hypothesized to be more sensitive to observed risk,
sensitivity to observed risk and danger will partially account for the negative correlation
between ideological conservatism and uneasiness in the past-tense condition.
Methods
Overview of Design
Participants were asked to read a short vignette that contained a relatable life
experience (e.g., purchasing a car or selecting a major) with instructions to empathize
with the perspective being expressed. Each vignette had two versions of its story. One
version portrayed the experience as something that has occurred in the past (past-tense)
while the other version portrayed that same experience as something that will occur in the
future (future-tense). Otherwise, the content and wording of each version was kept as
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identical as possible so that the temporal orientation of the story was the only thing that
meaningfully varied across the stories.
After reading their randomly assigned vignette (either past- or future-tense), a
manipulation check was used to determine whether participants were aware of the
temporal orientation of the vignette (e.g., “Did the scenario portray an event that
happened in the past, or an event that will happen in the future?”). Next, participants
were asked to use Likert-type scales to report their emotional response to the scenario
they just read (e.g., “If I were in the scenario, I would feel uneasy.”) and their level of
agreement to a series of statements surrounding forecasted and observed risk (e.g.,
“Creating social norms carries substantial risk”). Finally, participants were prompted to
fill out a demographic questionnaire which included questions about their age, sex,
political ideological preference, voting preference, and political affiliation.
Participants
A total of two hundred and forty-nine U.S. adults (aged 18 years and older) were
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). These participants were randomly
assigned into two different conditions (past-tense and future-tense). A total of sixty-eight
participants failed the manipulation check by indicating the scenario they read was in a
different temporal orientation than their assigned condition (e.g., indicating the scenario
was written in future-tense when it was written in past-tense). After accounting for the
participants who failed the manipulation check, the past-tense condition had a total of
ninety participants and the future-tense condition contained a total of ninety-one
participants (N = 181; Average age was 40 years old (min 20, max 74); 44% female;
Average income was $50,000; 65% democrat, 21% republican, and 6% libertarian; 39%
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liberal, 32% conservative, 16% moderate, and 10% independent; In 2020 election 65%
voted for Biden, and 20% voted for Trump). R software analysis suggests that a sample
size of 58 participants per condition has a 90% power to detect a small effect size of .25
with a significance level of 0.05 (two tailed; effect size measurement uses Cohen’s F).
Amazon’s MTurk has been validated for use as a representative sample for research
related to politics and political ideology (see, e.g., Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015),
generally shows similar results as other samples (for an example, see Conway et al.,
2017; Houck, Conway, & Repke, 2014).
Independent Variables
The key condition-level moderator is exposure to temporally oriented language
framed in either the past-tense or future-tense.
Type of Scenario. Two different scenarios were presented to participants in the
form of short vignettes. The topics contained within these short vignettes were chosen to
be easily relatable while remaining as ideologically neutral as possible. Vignette #1 asked
participants to read and empathize with the experience of a first-time car buyer. Vignette
#2 asked participants read and empathize with the experience of deciding what major to
pursue in college. Participants were asked to read their randomly assigned vignette while
imagining that they were experiencing the event firsthand.
Past Versus Future Tense. The two scenario conditions (first-time car buyer and
deciding what major to pursue in college) were each portrayed with two different
temporal framings, a past-tense condition where the events in the scenario were depicted
as having occurred in the past, and a future-tense condition where the events in the
scenario were depicted as having yet to occur in the future. In total, there were four
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different groups and two different conditions: Vignette #1P, first-time car buyer written
in the past-tense; Vignette #1F, first-time car buyer written in the future-tense; Vignette
#2P, deciding what major to pursue in college written in the past-tense; And Vignette
#2F, deciding what major to pursue in college written in the future-tense. All of these
scenarios with their accompanying instructions are included below.
Vignette #1P (buying a car in past-tense)
“Please read this short vignette. In doing so, please try and identify with the experience as
much as possible, imagining it as if you yourself were experiencing what is happening to
the person in the vignette. Please be prepared to answer questions about this experience
on the following pages:
Buying my first car was a daunting task at the time. I was worried about monthly
payments, what kind of mileage it would get, how often it would need to go in for
maintenance, and other things I didn’t have a clue about. It was a huge decision that had
a significant impact on my life. Thinking about the choice I made back then, I often
wonder if I made the right decision.
Vignette #1F (buying a car in future-tense)
“Please read this short vignette. In doing so, please try and identify with the experience as
much as possible, imagining it as if you yourself were experiencing what is happening to
the person in the vignette. Please be prepared to answer questions about this experience
on the following pages:
Buying my first car will be a daunting task when it’s time. I am worried about monthly
payments, what kind of milage it will get, how often it will need to go in for maintenance,
and other things I don’t have a clue about. It will be a huge decision that will have a
significant impact in my life. Thinking about the choice I will make someday, I often
wonder if I will make the right decision.”
Vignette #2P (deciding what major to pursue in college in past-tense)
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“Please read this short vignette. In doing so, please try and identify with the experience as
much as possible, imagining it as if you yourself were experiencing what is happening to
the person in the vignette. Please be prepared to answer questions about this experience
on the following pages:
Choosing what to study in college was really scary to me at the time. I was worried about
things like getting hired after I graduated, how much money I would make per year, and
whether or not I would succeed in all the areas that were important to me. It was a huge
decision that had a significant impact on my life. Thinking about the choice I made back
then, I often wonder if I made the right decision.”
Vignette #2F (deciding what major to pursue in college in future-tense)
“Please read this short vignette. In doing so, please try and identify with the experience as
much as possible, imagining it as if you yourself were experiencing what is happening to
the person in the vignette. Please be prepared to answer questions about this experience
on the following pages:
Choosing what to study in college will be really scary when it’s time. I am worried about
things like getting hired after graduation, how much money I will make per year, and
whether or not I will be successful in all the areas that are important to me. It will be a
huge decision that will have a significant impact in my life. Thinking about the choice I
will make someday, I often wonder if I will make the right decision.”
Political Ideology. The key individual-level moderator is participants’ selfreported ideology. Participants completed a two-item scale designed to evaluate political
orientation. It is anchored by liberal/conservative and Democrat/Republican. The
individual scores of these two items were averaged together to create a measure of
political conservatism where high scores reflect a more conservative orientation and low
scores reflect a more liberal orientation. This scale has been used and validated in prior
research in the field of political psychology (Conway et al., 2012; Conway et al., 2015).
Dependent Variable: Unease with the Vignette
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The key dependent variable is participants’ self-reported feelings of uneasiness
following the reading of their assigned vignette. Specifically, participants were asked to
rate how much they agree with the following four statements: “If I were in the scenario, I
would feel uneasy”, “If I were in the scenario, I would feel distressed”, “If I were in the
scenario, I would feel anxious”, and “If I were in the scenario, I would feel nervous”.2
Participants then used a Likert-type scale of 1-7 (where 1 equals complete
disagreement and 7 equals complete agreement) to indicate their level of agreement with
those statements. Those four items were averaged together to create a four-item scale of
“uneasiness” where high total scores reflected elevated levels of uneasiness in the context
of the scenario they had just read, and low total scores reflected static or low levels of
uneasiness. Participants were also asked to respond to a set of questions utilizing the
negative affect items adapted from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANASSF; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).3
Mediating Variable: Sensitivity to Observed Versus Forecasted Norm Risk
The key mediator is sensitivity to observed versus forecasted risk and danger.
Participants used a Likert-type scale of 1-7 (where 1 equals complete disagreement and 7
equals complete agreement) to indicate their level of agreement with six individual
statements about observed and forecasted risk and danger surrounding the idea of social
norms (e.g., “Creating social norms carries substantial risk”). The individual scores of
these six items were averaged to create two three-item scales, a forecasted risk scale
where high scores reflect a greater sensitivity to the risk and dangers inherent in change,
and an observed risk scale where high scores reflect a greater sensitivity to the risk and

2
3

Four-item uneasiness scale (a = .92).
Nine-item negative affect scale (a = .94).

18

danger inherent in the existing order.4 All six of these statements are listed below in their
conceptual categories.
Forecasted Risk Items:
1. Creating social norms carries substantial risk.
2. Creating new norms is dangerous for society.
3. In general, I’d rather keep the devil I know than trade them for a devil I don’t.
Observed Risk Items:
1. Maintaining social norms carries substantial risk.
2. Maintaining existing norms is dangerous for society.
3. In general, I’d rather trade the devil I know for a devil I don’t.
Analytic Strategy
The main hypothesis (H1) was tested by running regression analyses using
PROCESS Macro Model 1 (Hayes, 2013) in the statistical software SPSS. Ideological
conservatism (X), past-/future-tense (M), and their interaction term (ideological
conservatism*past-/future-tense (XM) were entered into a multiple regression analysis to
predict whether ideological conservatism operates differently on uneasiness (Y) in pasttense vs. future-tense conditions (determining if there is a conditional effect of X on Y
given M).
H1a was tested by running a correlation analysis within the future-tense condition.
This analysis examined the strength and direction of the relationship between ideological

4

Sensitivity to risk and danger questionnaire was completed by 181 eligible participants. The forecasted
risk subscale consisted of 3 items (a = .61); the observed risk subscale consisted of 3 items (a = .77). There
was a positive correlation found between the forecasted risk and observed risk subscales, r(179) = .54, p <
.000. A two-factor structure for the 6 items was generally (though not perfectly) supported based on a
principal components exploratory factor analysis with a varimax rotation (please see Table 2 in Appendix
I).
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conservatism (X) and uneasiness (Y) in the future-tense condition.
H1b was tested by running a correlation analysis within the past-tense condition.
This analysis examined the strength and direction of the relationship between ideological
conservatism (X) and uneasiness (Y) in the past-tense condition.
H2 (H2a and H2b) were tested by running separate within-condition (future-tense
or past-tense) regression analyses using PROCESS Macro Model 4 (Hayes, 2013).
H2a examined data within the future-tense condition by producing the indirect
effect of ideological conservatism (X) on uneasiness (Y) through sensitivity to forecasted
risk (M) in that condition (X à M à Y).
H2b examined data within the past-tense condition by producing the indirect
effect of ideological conservatism (X) on uneasiness (Y) through sensitivity to observed
risk (M) in that condition (X à M à Y).
Results
Interaction Between Ideological Conservatism and Temporal Uneasiness
The main hypotheses (H1, H1a, and H1b) explored the conditional effect of
ideological conservatism on uneasiness in the past-tense vs. future-tense conditions.
H1: A statistically significant negative interaction was found between ideological
conservatism and uneasiness in the past-tense and future-tense conditions (b = -.27, p =
.031; 95% CI lower = -.51, upper = -.02). While this does suggest a conditional effect
where ideological conservatism operates differently on feelings of uneasiness in pasttense vs. future-tense conditions, this interaction is in the opposite direction than
predicted by H1.5

5

Supplementary analyses including the participants who failed the manipulation check found a similar but
non-significant negative interaction pattern (e.g., b = -.12, p = .245; CI 95% lower = -.32, upper = .08).
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H1a: Ideological conservatism was found to be negatively related to uneasiness in
the future-tense condition (b = -.12, p = .132; 95% CI lower = -.28, upper = .04). While
this main effect is non-significant, it does suggest that ideological conservatism is
negatively correlated with feelings of uneasiness within the future-tense condition.
However, this relationship is in the opposite direction predicted by H1a.
H1b: Ideological conservatism was found to be positively related to uneasiness in
the past-tense condition (b = .14, p = .119; 95% CI lower = -.04, upper = .32). While this
main effect is non-significant, it does suggest that ideological conservatism is positively
correlated with feelings of uneasiness within the past-tense condition. However, this
relationship is in the opposite direction predicted by H1b.
Overall, these results suggest, contrary to expectations, that individuals who
reported lower levels of ideological conservatism (liberals) tended to experience more
uneasiness in the context of the future-tense scenarios whereas individuals who reported
higher levels of ideological conservatism (conservatives) tended to experience more
uneasiness in the context of the past-tense scenarios.6
Manipulation on a Sensitivity to Risk - Mediational Analyses
Although the results from testing H1, H1a, and H1b showed evidence in the
opposite direction of my theoretical model, nonetheless, it is possible that mediational
analyses will show results consistent with the model (Darlington & Hayes, 2017; Hayes,
2009; Hayes & Rockwood, 2017). The secondary hypotheses (H2: H2a and H2b) were
tested using PROCESS Macro Model 4 (Hayes, 2013) to explore the indirect effects of

6

Please refer to Table 1 in Appendix I for the complete list of negative affect correlations and their
conditional interactions. Most negative affect items showed a similar (albeit weaker) pattern to uneasiness,
particularly items conceptually closest to unease (e.g., “scared” and “afraid”). Items that were conceptually
more distant to uneasiness (e.g., “guilty” and “ashamed”) tended to show the least similar patterns.
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ideological conservatism on feelings of uneasiness through a heightened sensitivity to
either forecasted risk or observed risk in the future- and past-tense conditions.
H2a: Future-tense Condition with Forecasted Risk. Within the future-tense
condition, the indirect effect of ideological conservatism on uneasiness through a
sensitivity to forecasted risk was found to be statistically significant (indirect effect = .08,
SE = .04, p < .05, 95% CI lower = .01, upper = .17). Further zero-order correlation
analyses within this future-tense condition found positive correlations between
ideological conservatism and sensitivity to forecasted risk (IV with mediator; (r(89) =
.29, p = .006), as well as uneasiness and sensitivity to forecasted risk (mediator with DV;
r(89) = .28, p = .007). While a non-significant zero-order negative correlation was found
between ideological conservatism and uneasiness (r(89) = -.15, p = .144), partial
correlation analyses controlling for a sensitivity to forecasted risk revealed a statistically
significant negative correlation between ideological conservatism and uneasiness (r(88) =
-.26, p = .015). These results suggest that a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk may
partially account for the relationship found between ideological conservatism and
feelings of uneasiness in the future-tense condition, in the direction expected by H2a: As
predicted, forecasted risk was positively related to both conservatism and uneasiness, and
the relationship between conservatism and uneasiness went down when controlling for
forecasted risk.
H2b: Past-tense Condition with Observed Risk. Within the past-tense
condition, the indirect effect of ideological conservatism on uneasiness through a
sensitivity to observed risk was found to be statistically non-significant (indirect effect =
.04, SE = .04, p > .05, 95% CI lower = -.02, upper = .12). Further zero-order correlational
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analyses within this past-tense condition found positive correlations between ideological
conservatism and sensitivity to observed risk (IV with mediator; r(88) = .15, p = .171), as
well as uneasiness and sensitivity to observed risk (mediator with DV; r(88) = .34, p =
.001). A non-significant zero-order positive correlation was found between ideological
conservatism and uneasiness (r(88) = .17, p = .111), while partial correlation analyses
controlling for sensitivity to observed risk revealed a non-significant positive correlation
between ideological conservatism and uneasiness (r(87) = .13, p = .230). These results
suggest that a heightened sensitivity to observed risk did not significantly account for the
relationship found between ideological conservatism and uneasiness in the past-tense
condition.
Manipulation on a Sensitivity to Risk - Supplementary Mediational Analysis7
To better understand the results from the analyses conducted on the primary and
secondary hypotheses, I used PROCESS Macro Model 4 (Hayes, 2013) to further explore
the indirect effects of ideological conservatism on feelings of uneasiness through a
heightened sensitivity to risk. This time, I evaluated the pairings opposite of each
hypothesis: pairing forecasted risk with the past-tense condition and observed risk with
the future-tense condition. My reason for doing this was to see if perhaps the effects
reported above had more to do with risk in general or one kind of risk, instead of the
“condition-matched” risk I originally proposed.
Past-tense Condition with Forecasted Risk. Within the past-tense condition, the
indirect effect of ideological conservatism on uneasiness through a sensitivity to
forecasted risk was found to be statistically significant (indirect effect = .13, SE = .05, p <

7

For the combined future- vs. past-tense mediational analyses, please see Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix I.
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.05, 95% CI lower = 0.04, upper = 0.25). Further zero-order correlational analyses within
this past-tense condition found positive correlations between ideological conservatism
and sensitivity to forecasted risk (IV with mediator; r(88) = .34, p = .001) and sensitivity
to forecasted risk and uneasiness (mediator with DV; r(88) = .47, p < .000). A nonsignificant zero-order positive correlation was found between ideological conservatism
and uneasiness (r(88) = .17, p = .111), while partial correlation analyses controlling for
sensitivity to forecasted risk revealed a non-significant positive correlation between
ideological conservatism and uneasiness that substantially went down from zero-order
(r(87) = .02, p = .882). These results suggest that a heightened sensitivity to forecasted
risk may account for the relationship between ideological conservatism and uneasiness in
the past-tense condition, in much the same way as it did in the future-tense condition.
Future-tense Condition with Observed Risk. Within the future-tense condition,
the indirect effect of ideological conservatism on uneasiness through a sensitivity to
observed risk was found to be statistically non-significant (indirect effect = .03, SE = .03,
p > .05, 95% CI lower = -.02, upper = .10). Further zero-order correlational analyses
within this future-tense condition found positive correlations between ideological
conservatism and sensitivity to observed risk (IV with mediator; r(89) = .14, p = .197),
and uneasiness and sensitivity to observed risk (mediator with DV; r(89) = .24, p = .021).
A non-significant negative correlation was found between ideological conservatism and
uneasiness (r(89) = -.15, p = .144), while partial correlation analyses controlling for
sensitivity to observed risk revealed a negative correlation between ideological
conservatism and uneasiness (r(88) = -.20, p = .066). These results suggest that a
heightened sensitivity to observed risk did not significantly account for the relationship
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between ideological conservatism and uneasiness in the future-tense condition.
Discussion
Overall, analyses of H1 and H2 suggest that ideological conservatism has a
conditional effect on feelings of uneasiness in the context of past- vs. future-tense
scenarios, and that increased conservative uneasiness may be partially accounted for by a
heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk in the future-tense condition. Counter to
expectations, the H1 results suggest that individuals high in ideological conservatism are
more likely to experience elevated levels of uneasiness when imagining a scenario in the
past, while those with lower levels of ideological conservatism are more likely to
experience elevated levels of uneasiness when imagining a scenario in the future.
However, H2 was largely supported with results indicating (as originally predicted) that a
heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk partially accounted for the elevated feelings of
uneasiness among individuals high in ideological conservatism in the future-tense
scenario. These mixed theoretical findings suggest that a great deal of caution and
prudence is needed to avoid overinterpreting what exactly this study can tell us about the
relationship between political ideology and the subtle experience of temporal uneasiness.
In the following sections, I will briefly lay out and discuss the specific results
surrounding the unexpected interaction found between ideological conservatism and
temporal uneasiness, followed by a discussion surrounding H2’s findings with both the
original and the supplemental mediational manipulation on sensitivity to forecasted vs.
observed risk. Afterwards I will explore some possible reasons why H1 failed to achieve
in its theoretical aims, then I will attempt to explain why H2 largely succeeded in its
theoretical aims, following which, I will briefly discuss whether it is possible to make
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sense of the mixed results. Finally, I will lay out the limitations of the study and then
discuss a few of the possible directions this research might be extended to in the future.
Interaction Between Ideological Conservatism and Temporal Uneasiness.
Results from H1, H1a, and H1b suggest there is indeed a conditional effect of ideological
conservatism on general feelings of unease within the subtle context of past-tense vs.
future-tense scenarios. However, this conditional effect was revealed to be in the exact
opposite direction as predicted by H1, H1a, and H1b, with ideological conservatism
positively related to uneasiness in the past-tense condition and negatively related to
uneasiness in the future-tense condition.
Overall, these primary results suggest, contrary to expectations, that liberals
tended to experience a higher degree of uneasiness in the context of the future-tense
scenarios, whereas conservatives tended to experience a higher degree of uneasiness in
the context of the past-tense scenarios. We return to what this may mean in more detail in
a later section.
Sensitivity to Risk. Curiously, although my theoretical expectations for the
primary hypotheses were not met (and indeed the results went in exactly the opposite
direction), my theoretical expectations for mediational hypotheses showed results largely
consistent with my model. As expected, analyses of the secondary hypotheses (H2a)
revealed that a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk partially accounted for the
relationship between ideological conservatism and feelings of uneasiness in the futuretense condition. As predicted by H2a, these results indicate that within the future-tense
condition, elevated levels of uneasiness among individuals high in ideological
conservatism (conservatives) are partially explained by a heightened sensitivity to
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forecasted risk. However, H2b analyses failed to identify a similar pattern in the pasttense condition with no significant indirect effect found of ideological conservatism on
uneasiness through a sensitivity to observed risk in the past-tense condition. These results
from H2b suggest that a sensitivity to observed risk is unable to account for the
relationship found between ideological conservatism and feelings of uneasiness within
the past-tense condition. These combined H2 findings, along with the results of H1,
prompted the consideration of additional mediational analyses within the “opposite”
paired conditions (e.g., past-tense/forecasted risk and future-tense/observed risk) to gain a
broader understanding of what may be driving these effects.
Supplementary Analyses of Sensitivity to Risk. To better understand the
possible implications of H1’s and H2’s findings, subsequent mediational analyses
examined the two remaining (and unpredicted) paired conditions: the indirect effect of
ideological conservatism on feelings of uneasiness through a sensitivity to forecasted risk
in the past-tense condition, and the indirect effect of ideological conservatism on feelings
of uneasiness through a sensitivity to observed risk in the future-tense condition. Similar
to the findings of H2a, analyses within the forecasted risk/past tense condition revealed
that a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk partially accounted for the relationship
between ideological conservatism and feelings of uneasiness in the past-tense condition.
These results indicate that within the past-tense condition, elevated levels of uneasiness
among individuals high in ideological conservatism (conservatives) are partially
explained by a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk. However, analyses within the
observed risk/future tense condition produced results very similar to the findings of H2b,
where a heightened sensitivity to observed risk was unable to account for the relationship

27

between ideological conservatism and feelings of uneasiness in this future-tense
condition. Taking these supplemental analyses into consideration, recognizable patterns
began to emerge, with a strong differentiation between models that included a sensitivity
to forecasted risk and the models that included a sensitivity to observed risk. Models that
included a heightened sensitivity to observed risk as the mediating variable, regardless of
whether in the past- or future tense condition, failed to significantly account for any
portion of the relationship found between ideological conservatism and elevated feelings
of uneasiness within those conditions. Meanwhile, models that included a heightened
sensitivity to forecasted risk as the mediating variable consistently revealed statistically
significant indirect effects of ideological conservatism on feelings of uneasiness within
both the past- and future-tense conditions.
Overall, these results suggest that a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk may
partially account for the relationship found between ideological conservatism and
feelings of uneasiness in both the future-tense condition as well as the past-tense
condition. These results also suggest that a heightened sensitivity to observed risk does
not significantly account for the relationship found between ideological conservatism and
feelings of uneasiness in either of the temporally orientated conditions. Given these
results, it appears that forecasted risk plays a role in motivating feelings of uneasiness for
conservatives, regardless of the temporal context.
Results from H1, H1a, and H1b analyses indicate that ideological conservativism
is positively correlated with uneasiness in the past-tense condition, and negatively
correlated with uneasiness in the future-tense condition. However, H2 analyses suggest
that a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk partially explains the relationship between
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political conservatism and feelings of uneasiness in the past-tense as well as the futuretense conditions. These two findings are both inconsistent and semi-consistent
(respectively) with the original proposed theoretical framework, where conservatives
were expected to experience more uneasiness when exposed to future-tense scenarios
(explained by a sensitivity to forecasted risk) and liberals were expected to experience
more uneasiness when exposed to past-tense scenarios (explained by a sensitivity to
observed risk). In the following sections I will briefly discuss the possible reasons the
primary hypotheses failed, why perhaps H2 was at least partially supported, what may be
contributing to both of these results, and how future research may help illuminate these
findings.
Why Did H1 Fail? The theory for H1 was tentatively supported by the existing
research in the field. Although this prior research indicated that specific temporal
preferences exist between liberal and conservative populations (e.g., Robinson et al.,
2015), it is admittedly somewhat limited in both its scope and function. One of the
reasons for this study was to help expand the field’s understanding of temporal
preferences among political populations and perhaps this “failure” of H1 will further that
end.
Was there an unforeseen issue with the manipulation? Admittedly, the
manipulation itself was extremely weak. Anytime researchers attempt to manipulate
something subtle, there is a possibility that the manipulation will not work, even though
this weakness is necessary to elicit as much of a non-conscious response as possible.
Nonetheless, it is worth speculating on what might have happened with the manipulation.
One possibility is that the manipulation used to elicit this non-conscious response
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may possibly have resulted in only one temporal outlook. Perhaps all these scenarios
were unintentionally suggestive of impending or future risks and dangers (e.g., rather
than inducing a truly past-tense orientation), and this swayed the entire sample towards
only one temporal outlook: Specifically, a heightened sensitivity to impending or future
risk and danger. After all, even though I focused on both past and future tenses, in some
sense to participants, all the scenarios involved imagining something that had not directly
happened. This might explain why the future risk measure was more predictive in both
future and past tense conditions – maybe they both actually were psychologically
“future” to participants.
Of course, none of this would be an explanation as to why this subtle and
admittedly weak manipulation appeared to succeed in the opposite direction. After all, the
manipulation does appear to have worked in some fashion. The prediction that there
would be a conditional effect of political conservatism on uneasiness within past- vs.
future-tense conditions was borne out, albeit in the opposite direction than expected.
These results do suggest that liberals are more uneasy within the context of future-tense
scenarios while conservatives are more uneasy within the context of past-tense scenarios.
Perhaps this result -- counter to original expectations as it is -- can still provide an
important clue to better understand the different primary temporal perspectives (if there
are any) between the conservative and liberal political populations.
Given the type of manipulation involved and the limited research in the field in
this specific area, it really is much too soon to draw solid conclusions from this one
finding. However, it may be worth exploring what this result may mean. For example,
even if the manipulation may have only triggered a single temporal outlook (the issue of
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impending or future risk), it still required participates to evaluate that risk from a certain
perspective and with specific criteria. In the case of the liberal population, perhaps that
risk was evaluated from a present/future perspective, with the salient criteria originating
from their need to address those specific concerns (e.g., how to deal with impending risk
within the perspective of future possibilities). While in the case of the conservative
population, perhaps that risk was evaluated from more of a past/present/future
perspective, with the salient criteria originating from their need to address those specific
concerns (e.g., how to deal with impending risk within the perspective of past
certainties). This could possibly result in higher levels of uneasiness occurring in the
context where one’s perspective would place the evaluative criteria (past-tense for
conservatives and future-tense for liberals).
Alternatively, it could be possible that H1 appeared to “succeed” because it is
reflecting the exact opposite meaning of my original theoretical model, specifically, that
conservatives would prefer to engage with the future while liberals would prefer to
engage with the past. However, this seems unlikely. It is unlikely not only because it
largely goes against the existing, albeit limited, research in this area, but also because the
results from the secondary analyses (H2) show a pattern consistent with the idea that
conservative uneasiness is due in part to concerns with future risk. These results suggest
that not only do conservatives have a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk, but that
this specific sensitivity may help account for their feelings of uneasiness in both the pastand future-tense conditions.
Why Did H2 Work? Given the failure of H1, it is somewhat surprising that H2
was largely supported by the results. Once again, given the limited data, it is too early for
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solid conclusions. However, it appears that a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk may
partially account for feelings of uneasiness among those individuals who reported higher
levels of ideological conservatism regardless of whether they were in the past or future
condition. The models that looked at a heightened sensitivity to observed risk found that
it does not appear to account for the relationship between ideological conservatism and
feelings of uneasiness in either of the temporal conditions (past- or future-tense). Had the
original predictions surrounding H1 been proven to be correct, these results would have
largely explained those expected findings, but given the completely opposite nature of
H1’s results, it simply creates a series of difficult questions in need of further answers.
Making Sense of The Mixed Results. To be sure, the mixed results from H1 and
H2 make larger interpretation difficult, and it would be prudent to avoid overinterpreting
data that appears to contradict itself. However, it may be that these results are suggestive
that the original meaning behind the old Irish proverb, “better the devil you know than the
devil you don’t know”, provided the whole story from the beginning. I started with the
idea that conservatives would be more likely to prefer the devil they know to some
unknown future devil. Within both the past- and future-tense conditions, conservatives
consistently showed (compared to liberals) a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk; and
in both conditions, this sensitivity to forecasted risk consistently helped account for
conservative feelings of uneasiness.
But is it possible that the results from H1 could also be explained by the devil you
know? Although I can only speculate, it is indeed possible. The issue may be, contrary to
my original predictions, that perhaps we do not shy away from the thing we fear most,
perhaps instead we become fixated on it (such as high levels of uneasiness in
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conservatives in the past-tense condition). Then, using that knowledge, we can tentatively
approach the future with a blueprint of what to watch out for. However, it is possible that
this principle of behavior is more common to a subset of the population, specifically
among individuals who report higher levels of ideological conservatism.
If these patterns are successfully replicated in the future, it may open some
intriguing directions for additional research into the mechanisms contributing to the
uneasiness felt by each political population. For example, given that forecasted risk
seems to account for the relationship between conservatism and uneasiness in a similar
manner and to a similar degree, perhaps it could be suggested that we more fully engage
with the devil we know, in order to make a deal with the devil we don’t. Or in other
words, perhaps a “temporally transient risk management system” allows for the salience
found in the context of one temporal perspective to dictate the criteria for increased
sensitivity to potential risk in alternate temporal perspectives. Thus, using the knowledge
gleaned in the temporal perspective one has fully engaged with, they are then able to
approach any impending risk or danger with a seemingly comprehensive (albeit,
temporally biased) plan of mitigation. Much like the oft repeated quote “Those who do
not learn from history are doomed to repeat it” (attributed to George Santayana), this
behavior may allow one to confront any impending devils by first closely monitoring and
evaluating the devils from the past. Given the results from this study, it is possible that
this Temporally Transient Risk Management model exists and moreover may be more
common to one side of the political spectrum (e.g., specifically among conservatives
whose uneasiness is suggested to be partly accounted for by an elevated sensitivity to
forecasted risk in both past and future conditions).
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Limitations. Like all studies, this research is not without some limitations.
Foremost of these concerns is the manipulation itself. Given the relatively weak nature of
the two conditions (past- vs. future-tense) these results can only be viewed with a great
deal of caution, and there is a very real need to see if these effects can be replicated with
additional studies. The interaction effect in the opposite direction would be a very
interesting finding in its own right, if it was replicable. But given the tenuous and
conflicting nature of these data, caution is warranted.
Another issue is that the participants were collected using the online platform
Mturk, and the fictional stories they read may have little ability to invoke the specific
emotions and conditions found in the real world. While this is not a unique criticism of
this work and low-external validity studies have many benefits (see, e.g., Mook, 1983),
future research would do well to examine these processes in more real-world situations.
This sample was collected in early March 2022 and the responses may have been
impacted by a stressful atmosphere created by the novel 2020 COVID virus and its
accompanying restrictions beginning two years prior. This timing of this sample was also
during a politically charged midterm election year and this may have impacted the
participant’s sense of what topics may or may not be political in nature.
Additionally, this work was conducted entirely on U.S. samples. We do not claim
that these effects would necessarily occur in the same manner in other places – future
research should evaluate that question more closely as well.
Future Directions. In light of the general issues concerning the manipulation
used to produce these results (and the theoretically mixed results themselves), additional
reiterations of this study will be needed to confirm these two patterns. Specifically,

34

replication studies are needed for (1) the pattern where liberals tend to feel more uneasy
when subtly primed to think about the future, while conservatives tend to feel more
uneasy when subtly primed to think about the past, and (2) the pattern where a sensitivity
to forecasted risk tends to account for feelings of uneasiness among conservatives (but
not liberals) regardless of the temporal context they are presented with.
In addition to straight replication studies, it might be worthwhile to use different
manipulations and/or measurements in other paradigms to determine if the results found
in this study can be generalized to other types of temporally associated uneasiness. For
example, perhaps future work could use a manipulation of exposure to Abstract vs.
Realism artwork. It is possible that priming participants with one or the other of these
types of artistic expressions may trigger similar emotional responses as elicited in the
current study (e.g., uneasiness after reading a vignette written in the future tense). This
non-conscious priming could theoretically be accomplished via exposure to a painting
viewed by the participants for a short period of time. These paintings could be either of
art from the Realism movement (with emphasis on depicting reality as it exists) or art
from the Abstract movement (with emphasis on depicting reality in an altered state).
After viewing the paintings, the participants could be asked to describe their reaction to
the image and how it made them feel. These written impressions could then be analyzed
by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker et al. 2001) software to
identify if any linguistic patterns exist between conservatives and liberals in their use of
negative affective language (e.g., words associated with uneasiness, risk, and/or danger).
Then participants would be asked to use their personal preference in categorizing the
picture they viewed as belonging more to the past or to the future. This would create four
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conditions for potential analyses: Realism/past, Realism/future, Abstract/past, and
Abstract/future. If temporal patterns were found between political conservatism and the
use of negative affective language in these four conditions (e.g., elevated uneasiness
among conservatives in both the Realism/past and Abstract/past conditions), it may
provide an additional metric to better gauge the results of the current study regarding
whether feelings of uneasiness are triggered by temporally related cues. However, it is
possible that it would reveal a pattern more consistent with the original hypotheses
(elevated uneasiness among conservatives in the future conditions and among liberals in
the past conditions). Either result would help provide additional clues or crucial potential
directions to this nuanced research topic.
Another possible way to explore the validity and potential of the current study’s
findings would be to employ an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al. 1998)
to evaluate the speed in which temporally orientated words are associated with words
describing feelings of uneasiness. It is possible that conservatives and liberals will have
varied response speeds when tasked with grouping temporally orientated words (e.g., past
or future) with words commonly associated with uneasiness (e.g., anxious, nervous,
uncomfortable). For example, the study could record participants’ response times in
associating words like “past” or “yesterday” with words like “threat” vs. “safe,” or
“uneasy” vs. comfortable,” and then do the same with words like “future” or “tomorrow.”
If it was found that conservatives tended to respond faster to word associations like
“past” and “uneasy,” while liberals tended to respond faster to word associations like
“future” and “uneasy,” this would help strengthen the current study’s findings and
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perhaps justify further research into the possible mechanisms contributing to ideological
differences in temporal uneasiness.
Another potential direction for future research would be an examination of the
broader relationship between temporal attunement and political ideology and any possible
mechanisms that contribute to that relationship. While a limited amount of past research
does suggest a temporal dichotomy between political populations (with conservatives
oriented towards the past and liberals oriented towards the future; Robinson et al., 2015),
the results from this current study may suggest an alternative model for future studies to
explore. Specifically, that temporal attunement may be politically unilateral in nature. In
this current study, conservatives (but not liberals) tended to engage with the past to a
greater degree (as suggested by elevated uneasiness in the past-tense condition), however,
they presumably did so in an effort to stave off any risk and/or danger that may occur in
the future (as suggested by a heightened sensitivity to forecasted risk in both conditions).
It is possible that political conservatism is positively correlated with increasing emotional
engagement with multiple temporal perspectives (e.g., past, present, and future). The
theoretical Temporally Transient Risk Management model may serve as a tentative guide
in exploring this possibility. Perhaps conservatives experience greater salience in the
context of one temporal perspective (e.g., the past), which then dictates the criteria for
increased sensitivity to risk in other temporal perspectives (e.g., present and the future).
Meanwhile on the other end of the political spectrum, liberals may place an increasing
amount of focus on a single temporal perspective which regulates their emotional
engagement and directs their risk assessment.
This Temporally Transient Risk Management model may be able to be tested by
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presenting a potentially threatening issue or situation to participants (e.g., cars driving
next to the sidewalk can potentially throw road debris which may hit pedestrians) and
tasking them with choosing the best source of information that would allow them to solve
the issue. For example: "This is a potential problem that threatens you and those around
you, which of the following types of information do you think might be most helpful in
solving this problem? (1) More details about this problem as it existed previously in the
past. (2) More details about this problem as it exists now in this moment. (3) More details
about this problem as it may exist someday in the future.”
Following this, the participants could be asked whether they are personally most
concerned about the potential problem as it existed previously in the past, as it exists now
in the present, or as it may someday exist in the future. These two responses (temporal
information seeking, and temporal threat concern) could be measured against
participants’ levels of political conservatism to see if there is a positive relationship
between political conservatism, a preference to engage with the past, and concerns about
potential problems in the future. If such a relationship was found, this may suggest that
conservatives intuitively try to gain a better understanding of the devil they know in order
to counter the devil that they don’t, while individuals low in political conservatism
(liberals) may tend to orient their information seeking and their threat concerns towards a
single temporal orientation.
Expanding on this general framework of politically unilateral temporal
attunement, we may be able to explain why liberals tend to be more future-oriented in
their language (Robinson et al., 2015) other than a possible temporal dichotomy. For
example, temporal context itself may simply not be as salient to liberals as it is to
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conservatives. This was in fact suggested by the Lammers & Baldwin study (2018) where
communicating liberal topics to conservatives using a past-temporal focus (compared
with a future-temporal focus) tended to reduce political disagreement between liberals
and conservatives. Meanwhile, in this study they also found that communicating
conservative topics to liberals using a future-temporal focus did not have any effect on
the level of political disagreement. This could indicate that unilateral temporal
attunement may have facilitated a reduction in political disagreement for conservatives
but not for liberals. It may be worth noting that a somewhat similar study using Moral
Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004) found that framing topics with relevant
moral foundations (e.g., Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating for liberals, and Care/Harm,
Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, and Sanctity/Degradation for
conservatives; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) tended to increase the self-reported
magnitude and intensity of both liberals’ and conservatives’ political attitudes, and in the
case of conservatives, this framing altered some of the originally held attitudes about the
topics presented (Day et al. 2014).
Given these types of results from past studies, where conservatives tend to find
increased merit in arguments using temporally relevant or morally relevant cues while
liberals tend to find increased merit in morally relevant cues, we may be able to ascertain
if liberals’ tendency to reference to the future (as shown by Robinson et al., 2015) is
primarily in the service of some other relevant cue (e.g., Care/Harm) rather than the
simple merit of the future’s temporal orientation. This could potentially be tested by
exposing conservatives and liberals to a collection of twelve scenarios (six describing a
past event, and six describing a future event), where each scenario depicts a different
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(relativity gentle) violation of a specific moral foundation (Care/Harm,
Fairness/Cheating, Loyalty/Betrayal, Authority/Subversion, Sanctity/Degradation, and
Liberty/Oppression). Participants’ levels of uneasiness with the scenario they just read
could then be analyzed along with their level of political conservatism to see if there is a
conditional effect of political conservatism on uneasiness in each of the twelve individual
conditions as well as between the six collective past conditions and the six collective
future conditions. If there is a disruption to the simple temporal pattern suggested in the
current study (e.g., conservatives being more uneasy in the past-tense and liberals more
uneasy in the future tense), it may be an indication that the temporal uneasiness felt by
liberals and/or conservatives is more contingent on the possibility of salient moral
violations rather than temporal discomfort.
Taken together, all of these potential studies could build on and help explain the
pattern of effects found in the current study. As previously noted, it would be best to be
cautious in interpreting what may simply be a statistical anomaly. However, given that
the research in this particular area is very limited, any new information could be seen as
helpful in forwarding our understanding of how political ideology may, or may not, be
shaped and influenced by subtle temporal cues.
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Appendix I
Table 1
The relationship between political conservatism and negative emotion indicators.
Past Condition
Future Condition
Interaction
Unease Variable
.14
-.12
-.27*
Guilty
.12
.19
-.08
Scared
.20
-.06
-.25
Hostile
.25
.07
-.18
Irritable
.26*
.06
-.19
Ashamed
.28*
.23*
-.05
Upset
.39**
.02
-.37*
Jittery
.21
.01
-.21
Afraid
.21
-.07
-.28
Angry
.19
.07
-.13
Total Negative Affect .24*
.05
-.19
*p < .05. **p < .01
Note: Interaction term is the interaction between condition (past/future) and political conservatism on the
variable listed in each row.

Table 2
Exploratory Factor Analysis of Sensitivity to Forecasted/Observed Risk Items.
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Table 3
Mediation and correlation items in the future-tense condition.

Table 4
Mediation and correlation items in the past-tense condition.
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Appendix II
Independent Variables
Vignette #1P (first-time car buyer in past-tense)
“Please read this short vignette. In doing so, please try and identify with the experience as
much as possible, imagining it as if you yourself were experiencing what is happening to
the person in the vignette. Please be prepared to answer questions about this experience
on the following pages:
Buying my first car was a daunting task at the time. I was worried about monthly
payments, what kind of mileage it would get, how often it would need to go in for
maintenance, and other things I didn’t have a clue about. It was a huge decision that had
a significant impact on my life. Thinking about the choice I made back then, I often
wonder if I made the right decision.
Vignette #1F (first-time car buyer in future-tense)
“Please read this short vignette. In doing so, please try and identify with the experience as
much as possible, imagining it as if you yourself were experiencing what is happening to
the person in the vignette. Please be prepared to answer questions about this experience
on the following pages:
Buying my first car will be a daunting task when it’s time. I am worried about monthly
payments, what kind of milage it will get, how often it will need to go in for maintenance,
and other things I don’t have a clue about. It will be a huge decision that will have a
significant impact in my life. Thinking about the choice I will make someday, I often
wonder if I will make the right decision.”
Vignette #2P (choosing a profession in past-tense)
“Please read this short vignette. In doing so, please try and identify with the experience as
much as possible, imagining it as if you yourself were experiencing what is happening to
the person in the vignette. Please be prepared to answer questions about this experience
on the following pages:
Choosing what to study in college was really scary to me at the time. I was worried
about things like getting hired after I graduated, how much money I would make per
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year, and whether or not I would succeed in all the areas that were important to me. It
was a huge decision that had a significant impact on my life. Thinking about the choice I
made back then, I often wonder if I made the right decision.”
Vignette #2F (choosing a profession in future-tense)
“Please read this short vignette. In doing so, please try and identify with the experience as
much as possible, imagining it as if you yourself were experiencing what is happening to
the person in the vignette. Please be prepared to answer questions about this experience
on the following pages:
Choosing what to study in college will be really scary when it’s time. I am worried about
things like getting hired after graduation, how much money I will make per year, and
whether or not I will be successful in all the areas that are important to me. It will be a
huge decision that will have a significant impact in my life. Thinking about the choice I
will make someday, I often wonder if I will make the right decision.”
Political Ideology Questionnaire
“(1) Politically, I would say that I am (please indicate most appropriate answer):
Liberal

Conservative

Moderate

Independent

None/Cannot say

(2) Politically, I would be most likely to vote (please indicate most appropriate answer):
Democrat

Republican

Libertarian

Green Party

None/Cannot say

(3) Based on what I know about politics, I am (please indicate the number that best
represents your political attitudes):
1

2

3

4

5

6

Liberal

7
Conservative

(4) Based on what I know about politics, I am most likely to vote (please indicate number
that best represents your political attitudes):
1

2

3

4

5

Democrat

6

7
Republican
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(5) In the last presidential election, I voted for (please indicate most appropriate answer):
[Biden]

[Trump]

[Other]

[None/Cannot say]”

Dependent Variable: Unease with the Vignette
“Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement with the statements
below concerning the vignette you just read:
1 = complete disagreement
2 = mostly disagree
3 = somewhat disagree
4 = neither disagree nor agree
5 = somewhat agree
6 = mostly agree
7 = complete agreement
1. If I were in the scenario, I would feel uneasy.
2. If I were in the scenario, I would feel distressed.
3. If I were in the scenario, I would feel nervous.
4. If I were in the scenario, I would feel anxious.
Negative Affect Items (Adapted from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS-SF; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
“Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement with the statements
below concerning the vignette you just read:
1 = complete disagreement
2 = mostly disagree
3 = somewhat disagree
4 = neither disagree nor agree
5 = somewhat agree
6 = mostly agree
7 = complete agreement
1. If I were in the scenario, I would feel guilty.
2. If I were in the scenario, I would feel scared.
3. If I were in the scenario, I would feel hostile.
4. If I were in the scenario, I would feel irritable.
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5. If I were in the scenario, I would feel ashamed.
6. If I were in the scenario, I would feel upset.
7. If I were in the scenario, I would feel jittery.
8. If I were in the scenario, I would feel afraid
9. If I were in the scenario, I would feel angry.
Mediating Variable: Sensitivity to Observed Versus Forecasted Norm Risk
“Please indicate your level of agreement to the statements below using the following
scale:
1 = complete disagreement
2 = mostly disagree
3 = somewhat disagree
4 = neither disagree nor agree
5 = somewhat agree
6 = mostly agree
7 = complete agreement
1. Creating social norms carries substantial risk.
2. Maintaining social norms carries substantial risk.
3. Creating new norms is dangerous for society.
4. Maintaining existing norms is dangerous for society.
5. I would rather keep the devil I know than encounter a devil that I don’t know.
6. I would rather trade away the devil I know for a devil that I don’t know.
Items 2, 4, and 6 will be reversed scored. Low total scores reflect a greater sensitivity
to observed risk and danger while high total scores reflect greater sensitivity to forecasted
risk and danger.”
Left-Wing Authoritarianism (LWA) Scale (Conway et al., 2017a)
“For the following questions, please answer on a 1-7 scale, where 1 = ‘I disagree
completely’, 4 = ‘neutral/undecided’, and 7 = ‘I completely agree’.
1. Our country desperately needs a mighty and liberal leader who will do what has to
be done to destroy the radical traditional ways of doing things that are ruining us.
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2. Christian fundamentalists are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
3. It’s always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in science with
respect to issues like global warming and evolution than to listen to the noisy
rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubts in people’s minds.
4. Christian Fundamentalists and others who have rebelled against the established
sciences are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who agree with the
best scientific minds.
5. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get rid of our
“traditional” values, put some tough leaders in power who oppose those values,
and silence the troublemakers spreading bad (and so-called “traditional”) ideas.
6. There is absolutely nothing wrong with Christian Fundamentalist camps designed
to create a new generation of Fundamentalists.
7. Our country needs traditional thinkers who will have the courage to defy modern
progressive movements, even if this upsets many people.
8. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the traditional beliefs
eating away at our national fiber and growing progressive beliefs.
9. With respect to environmental issues, everyone should have their own personality,
even if it makes them different from everyone else.
10. Progressive ways and liberal values show the best way of life.
11. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by
protesting against abortion rights or in favor of reinstating school prayer.
12. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush the
evil of pushy Christian religious people, and take us forward to our true path.

53

13. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our
government, supporting religion, and ignoring the “normal way” things are
supposed to be done.
14. We should strongly punish those who try to uphold what they claim are “God’s
laws” about abortion, pornography, and marriage, when they break the actual laws
of the country in order to do so.
15. There are many radical, immoral Christian people in our country today, who are
trying to ruin it for their religious purposes, whom the authorities should put out
of action.
16. A Christian’s place should be wherever he or she wants to be. The days when
Christians are submissive to the conventions of this country belong strictly in the
past.
17. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of progressive thinking, do what
the best liberal authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the religious and
conservative “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.
18. With respect to environmental issues, there is no “ONE right way” to live life;
everybody has to create their own way.
19. Christian Fundamentalists should be praised for being brave enough to defy the
current societal and legal norms.
20. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of Christian troublemakers
would just shut up and accept their group’s proper place in society.”

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale (Altermeyer, 1998)
“For the following questions, please answer on a 1-7 scale, where 1 = ‘I disagree
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completely’, 4 = ‘neutral/undecided’, and 7 = ‘I completely agree’.
1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
2. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
3. It’s always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government
and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying
to create doubts in people’s minds.
4. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no
doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.
5. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our
traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers
spreading bad ideas.
6. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.
7. Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional
ways, even if this upsets many people.
8. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating
away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.
9. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual
preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.
10. The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way of
life.
11. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by
protesting for abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.
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12. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil,
and take us back to our true path.
13. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our
government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way” things are
supposed to be done.
14. God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed
before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.
15. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to
ruin it for their godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.
16. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women
are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.
17. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining
everything.
18. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.
19. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy
“traditional family values.”
20. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just
shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society.”
Manipulation Check
“Please recall the scenario you read earlier in the study and answer the following
question:
1. Did the scenario portray an event that happened in the past or an event that will
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happen in the future?
a. Past
b. Future
General Background Questionnaire:
“1. Age:___________
2. Biological sex assigned at birth:
Male

Female

Intersex

3. How would you define your gender:
Male Female
Non-binary

Transgender (Male to Female) Transgender (Female to Male)
Genderqueer Intersex

Agender

Another gender________

4. Ethnic Background:____________
5. Religion:
( )

Buddhist

( )

Christian/Catholic

( )

Hindu

( )

Muslim

( )

Jewish

( )

B’ahai

( )

Christian/Protestant

( )

Other religion: ___________

6. Describe in your own words what you think the experimenters were expecting
to happen in this study:
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